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Abstract
This paper investigates the theoretical impact of including two empirically-grounded inno-
vations in a lifecycle portfolio choice model. The ﬁrst innovation is a portfolio adjustment cost
which employees face when managing their ﬁnancial wealth rather than delegating the task
to a professional money manager. When job-speciﬁc human capital is accumulated through
learning-by-doing, investing time in ﬁnancial management imposes opportunity costs in terms
of current and future human capital accumulation. The second innovation is the incorporation of
age-dependent eﬃciency patterns in ﬁnancial decision making. These two innovations replicate
observed inactivity in portfolio adjustment patterns, especially for younger and older employees.
This framework also allows an analysis of the choice between managing one's own money and
delegating the task to a ﬁnancial advisor. The calibrated model quantiﬁes welfare gains that
the delegation option can bring to the lifecycle setting.
1 Introduction
Managing one's money can be a daunting task for people who are not deeply involved with ﬁnancial
markets day in and day out, or who suﬀer from ﬁnancial illiteracy [Lusardi and Mitchell (2007)].
The fact that deﬁned contribution pensions have become so widespread exacerbates this problem,
since employees are increasingly required to manage their own retirement accruals. The reality is
∗This paper was also circulated under the title Costly Portfolio Adjustment of Working Investors and the Role of
Financial Advisors. I acknowledge helpful comments from Alex Gelber, Dana Kiku, David Musto, Greg Nini, Itay
Goldstein, Jacqueline Wise, Jeremy Tobacman, Jessica Wachter, Jialun Li, Kent Smetters, Olivia S. Mitchell, Robert
Stambaugh, Santosh Anagol, Steve Utkus and seminar participants at BPUB900. I also acknowledge the support of
the NIH/NIA Grant # P30 AG12836, the Pension Research Council/Boettner Center for Pensions and Retirement
Security at the University of Pennsylvania, and the NIH/NICHD Population Research Infrastructure Program R24
HD-044964, all at the University of Pennsylvania. All errors are my own.
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that many individuals appear to do a very poor job of managing their own ﬁnances [c.f. Tang,
Mitchell, Mottola and Utkus (2010)], indicating a probable need for professional advisors.
The goal of this paper is to develop a lifecycle model to evaluate the role of ﬁnancial advisors
in helping employees to manage their ﬁnancial portfolios. I incorporate human capital accumulation
and ineﬃciency evidence from the ﬁnance literature in a standard lifecycle model. The ﬁrst innova-
tion is to allow for portfolio adjustment costs which many people must bear when managing their
own ﬁnancial wealth. This has a particular impact if the employee must accumulate job-speciﬁc
human capital through learning by doing; in this instance, spending time on one's own ﬁnancial
management imposes an opportunity cost in terms of current and future job-related human capital
accumulation. I also model an age-related time eﬃciency pattern for ﬁnancial decision making, in
keeping with observed empirical evidence. These two factors are likely to make it costly for individ-
uals to manage their own portfolios in ways that are consistent with observed low levels of trading
in workers' 401(k) accounts [Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), Mitchell et al. (2006)].
I examine the role of ﬁnancial advisors in terms of time cost minimizers. Previous eﬀorts
in household ﬁnance have focused on optimal portfolio allocation patterns for a rational forward-
looking consumer who must decide on his own how to allocate his accruals between stocks and
bonds [c.f. Cocco et al. (2005); Horneﬀ et al. (2009)]. However, investors can also delegate portfolio
management to ﬁnancial advisors, which may be a more appealing option when there are high
costs for managing their ﬁnances. In this regard, the need for a study on ﬁnancial advisors in
household ﬁnance has been highlighted [Campbell (2006)]. I incorporate ﬁnancial advisors as one
of the possible portfolio management schemes that investors can choose. When investors choose
the delegation option, they can update their portfolios without sacriﬁcing time, but do pay some
portion of their wealth to ﬁnancial advisors in management fees.
In this model, introducing a forgone opportunity to accumulate human capital generates a
U-shaped and left-skewed pattern of portfolio inertia over ages when no delegation option exists.
Young investors are most inactive and middle-aged investors are most active in managing their
own money. Since young employees have a low level of human capital accumulation and also have
the longest usage horizon, their cost for ﬁnancial adjustment will be higher than that of middle-
aged employees who have accumulated a more signiﬁcant level of human capital. A diﬀerent level of
portfolio adjustment cost across all age groups results in a diﬀerent pattern of portfolio management
across age groups. The introduction of a delegation option has a signiﬁcant impact on all age groups
replacing the portfolio inertia, but there is still a divergent pattern of portfolio management across
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ages.
This paper is related to the literature of portfolio allocation with ﬂexible labor supply [Bodie
et al. (1992); Gomes and Michaelides (2003); Gomes et al. (2008); Chai et al. (2009); Horneﬀ
et al. (2009)]. The model uses a discrete dynamic choice technique as in Adda and Cooper (2000)
and Bonaparte and Cooper (2009). We draw the pattern of cost for ﬁnancial decision making
from previous empirical ﬁndings that individual ﬁnancial deﬁciency is a sizable component in the
households' ﬁnancial management [Lusardi and Mitchell (2007); Sumit Agarwal and Laibson (2009)].
The main contribution of this paper is to solve a lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply
and portfolio choice with a ﬁnancial management cost, which allows us to predict the demand for
a delegation option over ages and measure the welfare gains of available advisory services. The
calibrated model predicts that the delegation option can bring 19.5% welfare gains in terms of
certainty equivalent consumption stream. This paper is also the ﬁrst investigation of the impact of
a time cost on investors' portfolio choice in the context of endogenous human capital accumulation
in a lifecycle setting.
In what follows, section 2 describes the speciﬁcation of investors' problem of portfolio choice.
The model ﬁrst deﬁnes a management scheme of portfolio inertia and shows a suﬃciency condition
for investors to choose portfolio inertia. Next I introduce the option of hiring ﬁnancial advisors.
Section 4 presents a numerical solution of the model. I conclude with a discussion of the implications
of this paper's ﬁndings for the ﬁnancial advisory industry, retirement plan sponsors and policy
makers for retirement pension plans.
2 Speciﬁcation of Dynamic Portfolio Choice Model
The model incorporates a dynamic choice of the equity share of the portfolio, labor supply and
human capital accumulation, which inﬂuence an employee's current and future labor income and
ﬁnancial wealth.
2.1 Assumption on Time Budget and the Ineﬃciency Pattern of Financial De-
cision Making over Lifecycle
I assume that an investor is endowed with a normalized amount of time of 1 at each period and
that he can allocate this time to working(lt) or consuming leisure(Lt). The time can be interpreted
as a physical time of 24 hours or the mental capacity that we allocate to various activities in daily
life.
Managing ﬁnancial assets encompasses various activities from opening a brokerage account
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(but not limited) to analyzing various ﬁnancial products. When the main task of an investor's job
is not involved in ﬁnancial work, which is the case for most DC retirement plan participants, self-
management of ﬁnancial asset will inevitably eat into a worker's time or mental resources, because
searching and processing information is costly to them. Because workers are compensated according
to their job-speciﬁc skills (or human capital) and because these job-speciﬁc skills are accumulated
mostly through work experience, they will incur an opportunity cost as a result of the time spent
managing their ﬁnancial assets. 1.
In this model, the explicit opportunity cost for adjusting one's portfolio is captured by the
time eﬃciency (φt) of ﬁnancial decision making. I assume an investor is not well informed regarding
the task of ﬁnancial management, so he should allocate some portion of his available time to acquire
and process various information related to portfolio management2. Therefore, an investor faces the
time constraint as follows
lt + Lt + φt1{at=1} = 1
where at = 1 is an indicator for active portfolio management. This time constraint condition
implies that an investor should incur a time cost when making his own choices to implement an
optimal portfolio3. Sumit Agarwal and Laibson (2009) documented younger and older people are
likely to make more mistakes when it comes to ﬁnancial decisions. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) also
documented the time cost of the consumer's choice regarding various non-ﬁnancial products. This
empirical evidence shows that making an eﬃcient ﬁnancial decision depends on age and that middle-
aged people tend to make fewer mistakes in controlling their wealth levels. I have implemented this
age-related eﬃciency pattern of ﬁnancial decision making as the amount of time they need for
their ﬁnancial decisions; a low φt implies that the investor can do so eﬃciently, and thus quickly
implement his new portfolio choice. I have adopted the empirical evidence of an age-related pattern
of eﬃcient ﬁnancial decision making with a U-shaped φt over the lifecycle in this model. Note that
1There might be a group of people that enjoys self-ﬁnancial management or even believes that they have a good
skill to outperform the market or professional investors. However, the proportion of these people is observed to be
very low among investors according to the literature of retirement pension management. Moreover, their performance
generally has not been superior to that of the market [Lusardi and Mitchell (2007); Mitchell et al. (2009)].
2Tasks related to the portfolio management may include (but are not limited to) opening accounts, tracking past
market condition, monitoring market, ﬁnding the optimal portfolio level and executing the order of transaction.
3After investors decide how to allocate their wealth between risk-free and risky assets, they also have to spend
time to implement their new choices. For example, if they are implementing their choices by purchasing mutual
funds, they have to read and compare many mutual fund companies' prospectuses and execute trading orders. If
they cannot ﬁnd a single mutual fund that implements their choice, they need to form a portfolio of various mutual
funds to achieve their desired level of equity share.
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this time cost does not depend on the amount of the adjusted portfolio share4. In this model,
investors should incur a new time cost(φt) in each period, because they should solve their lifecycle
model and implement the new choice again.
2.2 Assumption on Human Capital Accumulation Process
I assume job-speciﬁc human capital is accumulated through learning by doing [Arrow (1962)]. I
denote Ht and lt as the job-speciﬁc human capital and working time, respectively, at time t. The
law of motion of job speciﬁc human capital is
Ht+1 = (1− δt)Ht + Ft (Ht, lt)
where Ft (·, ·) is an experience formulation function and δt is a depreciation rate5 of job speciﬁc
human capital.
An important feature of this formulation is the dynamic property of labor supply. The
current working time(lt) not only increases current labor income, but also can increase the stock of
future human capital, which will lead to higher labor income in the future6. Much previous research
involving the labor supply model, including Bodie et al. (1992) and Cocco et al. (2005), incorporated
wage income as an important source of wealth, but the working decision only aﬀected the current
income level. Thus, they implicitly assumed that working time is a substitute for current leisure
time and that the price of leisure was the current hourly wage. In this paper's model, however,
the investor should consider future human capital accumulation, an age-related eﬃciency pattern
of ﬁnancial decision making and the current level of leisure, when he decides how much time to
allocate to working.
2.3 Assumption on Labor Income and Asset Return
I assume labor income is determined by an employee's job-speciﬁc human capital level(Ht) and wage
shock(Yt).
labor incomet = ltHtYt
4This ineﬃciency cost comes technically from the complexity that a normal worker faces when implementing his
choice from the dynamic programming problem [see e.g. Johnson et al. (1987)].
5This can also be interpreted as `obsolete rate' of skills. Some set of knowledge can be outdated by the advent of
new technology.
6This can be also interpreted as a reputation eﬀect in a job market. With higher level of human capital accumulated
by more working time in the current period, the worker will be rewarded higher by the labor market or the current
ﬁrm in the next and future periods.
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where lt represents working hours. The accumulated human capital Ht is comparable with the
age-speciﬁc, deterministic wage trend in the lifecycle model literature [see e.g., Cocco et al. (2005),
Gomes et al. (2008)]. In this model, however, Ht is endogenously accumulated over time by a
worker's labor supply as in section 2.2.
The wage shock (yt ≡ log Yt) follows an AR(1) process and is inﬂuenced by an idiosyncratic
shock(t).
yt = η + ρyt−1 + 
y
t
where yt ∼ iidN (0, σy).
I consider two asset classes:a stock and a risk-less bond. The stock return(Rt) is assumed to
be i.i.d log normally distributed7 over the years.
logRt ∼ iidN (ζ, σζ)
The stock return shock and wage shock can be correlated:
covt (yt, logRt) = σζ
The riskless bond has return R at all periods. I do not consider the inﬂation rate. Thus, the model
captures the inﬂation-adjusted phenomenon of a portfolio decision problem. I denote Rt+1 as the
stock return from t to t+ 1, so the decision time horizon is that pit+1 is determined at period t and
the return is realized at period t+ 1.
2.4 Assumptions on Portfolio Choice and Wealth Dynamics
At time t, the investor chooses the equity portion (pit+1) in his portfolio and the portfolio will have
return
Rpt+1 = (1− pit+1)R+ pit+1Rt+1
Note that Rpt+1 is a random variable at time t and is realized at time t+ 1.
7Tang et al. (2010) showed individuals generally have lower returns from managing their own portfolio. For
simplicity, this paper assumes equity returns are the same for every portfolio management schemes (inertia portfolio,
active management and delegation).
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Denoting ct as consumption, the dynamic budget constraint can be formulated as
8
Wt+1 = R
p
t+1 (Wt + ltHtYt − ct) (1)
Total cash-in-hand in period t (Wt+1) consists of ﬁnancial wealth(Wt) and labor income(ltHtYt).
After consuming ct in period t, it is invested with return R
p
t+1.
2.5 Assumptions on Preferences and Time Horizon
In the manner of Gomes et al. (2008), an investor has a standard time-separable, modiﬁed Cobb-
Douglas power utility function over consumption(ct) and leisure(Lt) given by
U (ct, Lt) =
1
1− γ (ct (Lt)
α)1−γ
where α captures an investor's preference over consuming leisure. I only consider a portfolio adjust-
ment decision during working periods and there is no decision problem after the retirement time
(T ). The retirement time is exogenously ﬁxed(T ). 9.
3 Dynamic Portfolio Choice Problem with Portfolio Inertia and the Role of
Financial Advisors
One important feature of individual portfolio management is the low turnover ratio or portfolio
inertia [see e.g., Bilias et al. (2009); Mitchell et al. (2006)].
3.1 Portfolio Inertia
The model in this paper deﬁnes inactivity or inertia in portfolio management with respect to the
opportunity cost of the portfolio adjustment and the time eﬃciency of ﬁnancial decision making.
Deﬁnition 1. Portfolio inertia at period t is deﬁned as a naive choice of the previous period's
portfolio (pit) for next period's portfolio (pit+1) without incurring time cost(φt).
By simply choosing his previous portfolio (pit) as the next period's portfolio (pit+1), the investor
does not have to sacriﬁce any portion(φt) of his available time to solve his optimization problem
8We can also introduce a direct transaction cost(C (pit, pit+1)) for portfolio adjustment. Then the wealth dynamics
will beWt+1 = R
p
t+1
(
Wt + ltHtYt − C (pit, pit+1)1{adjustment} − ct
)
when the direct transaction cost is incorporated.
However, I do not focus on direct monetary costs in this model. See Bonaparte and Cooper (2009) for estimating the
direct monetary cost of portfolio adjustment.
9See Smetters and Chen (2009) for a discussion about the role of social security in explaining the low level of
portfolio share among young workers.
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and implement its solution. Therefore, if the investor behaves with portfolio inertia, his next period
portfolio(pit+1) share does not change from the previous level(pit) and his time constraint is not
impacted by the eﬃciency pattern(φt) of ﬁnancial decision making. Thus, when an investor chooses
portfolio inertia, he has the equity share and time constraint as follows
pit+1 = pit
lt + Lt = 1
Recall that lt and Lt denote working time and leisure respectively.
Note that the same portfolio choice over the subsequent periods does not constitute portfolio
inertia. It is possible for an investor to choose to actively manage his portfolio by incurring the
time cost (φt) and end up choosing the previous portfolio(pit) as the optimum for the next period's
portfolio(pit+1). In this case, the portfolio choice is not naive and the investor has to sacriﬁce some
portion (φt) of his available time.
Since portfolio inertia allows that the previous portfolio choice can aﬀect the current period's
decision regarding a portfolio management scheme, the previous portfolio also serves as a state
variable10. Other state variables include wealth level(Wt), accumulated human capital level(Ht)
and current wage shock(yt). In total, we have 4 choice variables: portfolio management scheme
(i.e., portfolio inertia or active management), labor supply(lt), the next period's equity share (pit+1)
and consumption(ct).
An investor should solve a sequential problem as follows:
max
{ct,lt,pit+1,(at)}Tt=0
E
[
T∑
t=0
βtut (ct, Lt)
]
s.t ct ≤Wt + ltHtYt
Wt+1 = R
p
t+1 (Wt + ltHtYt − ct)
Ht+1 = (1− δt)Ht + Ft (Ht, lt)
lt + Lt + φt1{at=1} = 1
yt+1 = η + ρyt + t+1
where {at} is a decision set in which at = 1 indicates a portfolio adjustment and at = 0 indicates
10Bonaparte and Cooper (2009) also investigates the cost of portfolio adjustment and used the previous portfolio
as one of state variables.
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portfolio inertia.
In the manner of Adda and Cooper (2000), I deﬁne V at (Wt,Ht, pit, yt) as the discounted lifetime
utility of an investor when he chooses an `active management' scheme. Similarly, V it (Wt,Ht, pit, yt)
denotes the discounted lifetime utility of an investor when he chooses a `portfolio inertia' scheme. I
deﬁne the value function at period t as Vt (Wt,Ht, pit, yt) ≡ max
{
V at (Wt,Ht, pit, yt) , V
i
t (Wt,Ht, pit, yt)
}
.
The value function for each portfolio management scheme is deﬁned as
V at (Wt, Ht, pit, yt) = max{ct,pit+1,lt}
ut (ct, Lt) + βEt [Vt+1 (Wt+1, Ht+1, pit+1, yt+1)]
s.t. ct ≤Wt + ltHtYt
Wt+1 = R
p
t+1 (Wt + ltHtYt − ct)
Ht+1 = (1− δt)Ht + Ft (Ht, lt)
lt + Lt + φt = 1
yt+1 = η + ρyt + t+1
and the value function for choosing portfolio inertia is deﬁned as
V it (Wt, Ht, pit, yt) = max{ct,lt}
ut (ct, Lt) + βEt [Vt+1 (Wt+1, Ht+1, pit+1 = pit, yt+1)]
s.t ct ≤Wt + ltHtYt
Wt+1 = R
p
t+1 (Wt + ltHtYt − ct)
Ht+1 = (1− δt)Ht + Ft (Ht, lt)
lt + Lt = 1
yt = η + ρyt−1 + t
When V at ≥ V it , the investor chooses an active management scheme (at = 1). Otherwise, he chooses
portfolio inertia. The diﬀerence between the two value functions are the time constraint and the
next period's portfolio choice. The beneﬁt of portfolio inertia is the saved time but the previous
portfolio may not be the optimal choice for the current period, which maximizes the lifetime utility
even when considering time cost φt.
Before investigating the role of ﬁnancial advisors in this setting, I will brieﬂy discuss suﬃcient
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conditions for an investor to choose portfolio inertia. Let
(
lˆat , pˆi
a
t+1, cˆ
a
t
)
and
(
lˆit, pˆi
i
t+1 = pit, cˆ
i
t
)
be
maximizers11 of the objective functions of an active management scheme and a portfolio inertia
scheme.
Proposition 2. For any
(
lˆat , pˆi
a
t+1, cˆ
a
t
)
with max
{∣∣∣lˆat − lˆit∣∣∣ , ∣∣cˆat − cˆit∣∣} < ∣∣pˆiat+1 − pit∣∣, there exists
δ∗ > 0 such that ∀pˆiat+1 with
∣∣pˆiat+1 − pit∣∣ < δ∗ implies V it (Wt, Ht, pit, yt) > V at (Wt, Ht, pit, yt).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The implication of this proposition is simple and intuitive. When next period's labor and
consumption levels chosen by an active portfolio management scheme are very close to those chosen
by a portfolio inertia scheme, there is a `dominating boundary of portfolio inertia' where the portfolio
inertia is superior to the active management scheme. In other words, when an investor expects that
he would end up choosing a similar pair of consumption level and labor supply in the next period,
a small change in the portfolio will only be costly without improving his discounted lifetime utility.
So it is optimal for him not to ﬁddle around with portfolio management.
3.2 The Role of Financial Advisors
The current model enables us to explore the role of ﬁnancial advisors12 in portfolio management
and to conduct counterfactual experiments about their contributions to investors' portfolio choices.
Reasons for delegating portfolio management may include time cost, the eﬃciency gain due to lower
transaction costs and positive beliefs regarding professional managers' skills. In this paper, I focus
on investors' time costs associated with human capital accumulation.
When an investor chooses to delegate a portfolio management task, he pays some portion (ϕt)
of the total ﬁnancial wealth (Wt) to a ﬁnancial advisor as a management fee. The explicit beneﬁt of
hiring ﬁnancial advisors is the saved time, which can then be used to work (and accumulate more
job-speciﬁc knowledge) or enjoy leisure. If he chooses to manage his ﬁnancial portfolio by himself,
he does not have to pay this fee (ϕt), but should incur a time cost (φt), which is associated with
his age-based eﬃciency pattern of ﬁnancial decision making. In this paper, I consider a ﬁnancial
advisor, who is very involved in an investor's decision making in the sense that she not only chooses
a portfolio, but also proposes an optimal consumption level and labor supply.
11The existence of these solutions is discussed in the following chapter.
12In U.S ﬁnancial markets, RIAs (Registered Investment Advisors) are registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and give advice on investing in various ﬁnancial products such as stocks, bond, mutual funds, etc. They
also manage portfolios of securities for their household or ﬁrm clients. This role can be technically interpreted as
helping to implement the optimal portfolio choice of investors.
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One important issue in delegating portfolio management is the possible conﬂict of interest
between an investor (principal) and a ﬁnancial advisor (agent). Because an investor maximizes his
own utility over consumption and leisure, which are aﬀorded by accumulated wealth, his optimal
portfolio decision may be diﬀerent from that of a ﬁnancial advisor who maximizes only her total
revenue from managing clients' wealth.
If an investor observes the choice of an advisor (ﬁrst-best case), he can make sure his ﬁrst-
best outcome is achieved. Denote cFBt (Wt, Ht, pit, yt) , pi
FB
t+1 (Wt, Ht, pit, yt) and l
FB
t (Wt, Ht, pit, yt)
for t = 1, . . . , T as the ﬁrst-best policy of consumption, portfolio and labor supply for the investor.
It is a solution of the following dynamic optimization problem
Vt (Wt, Ht, pit, yt)
= max
{ct,pit+1,lt}
ut (ct, Lt) + βEt [Vt+1 (Wt+1, Ht+1, pit+1, yt+1)]
s.t ct ≤Wt + ltHtYt
Wt+1 = (1− ϕt)Rpt+1 (Wt + ltHtYt − ct)
Rpt+1 = (1− pit+1)R+ pit+1Rt+1
Ht+1 = (1− δt)Ht + Ft (Ht, lt)
lt + Lt = 1
yt+1 = η + ρyt + t+1
Note that the employee does not have to incur a time cost φt and pays a management fee ϕt out of
his wealth.
However, an investor does not usually directly observe the ﬁnancial advisor's choice at the be-
ginning of time t. The advisor will choose {ct, pit+1, lt} to maximize ϕt−1Wt+βEt
[
ϕtR
p
t+1 (Wt + ltHtYt − ct)
]
given the above constraints. Since the ﬁnancial advisor's objective function is diﬀerent from that
of an investor, the chosen policy function can be diﬀerent from the ﬁrst-best solution. Then the
investor may incur additional costs to monitor the ﬁnancial advisor's behavior.
In a dynamic setting, however, this information cost from a moral hazard problem can be
mitigated because the ﬁnancial advisor should also consider future revenue (or reputation), which
will depend on the current period's outcome. One important condition for the investor to im-
plement his ﬁrst-best choice is the veriﬁability of the ﬁnancial advisor's choice. This is possible
in our model setting when we assume the return process is easily observed by the investor or
11
other competing ﬁnancial advisors. Since the return process Rt is revealed to the investor
13, he
can easily discover the portfolio choice of the ﬁnancial advisor in the previous period. More for-
mally, with the knowledge of wealth level Wt+1, fee level ϕt, bond return R, wage shock yt and
consumption-labor choice {ct, lt}, which are all known at period t+ 1, the investor can calculate pit
from Wt+1 = (1− ϕt)Rpt+1 (Wt + ltHtYt − ct).
Now, consider a contract that speciﬁes the following
1. If
(
cFBt , pi
FB
t , l
FB
t
)
=
(
cDt , pi
D
t , l
D
t
)
for t = 1, . . . , T − 1, the investor pays a pre-determined fee
ϕt.
2. If
(
cFBt , pi
FB
t , l
FB
t
) 6= (cDt , piDt , lDt ) for t = 1, . . . , T − 1, the investor ﬁres the current ﬁnancial
advisor and hires another advisor. The original ﬁnancial advisor has no outside option in the
next period by assumption.
3. This contract is eﬀective at every period.
In short, an investor can punish a ﬁnancial advisor by ﬁring her (and replacing her with another
advisor) when he learns that the ﬁrst-best has not been chosen at the beginning of period t. Because
the outside option for a ﬁnancial advisor is zero by assumption, cheating will never be superior for
a ﬁnancial advisor to choosing an investor's ﬁrst-best choice. Thus, this contract will ensure that
the ﬁnancial advisor chooses the ﬁrst-best.
This contract enables us to solve only one (i.e., the investor's) dynamic programming problem
instead of two (the investor's and the ﬁnancial advisor's). An investor's maximization problem will
be implemented by a ﬁnancial advisor.14
Therefore, the investor's problem can be summarized as
13We can also assume competitive market of ﬁnancial advisors. This implies every advisors are paid same fee
ϕt when he is hired as a ﬁnancial advisor by an investor. I also assume this fee includes next-period monitoring
cost . Even though the investor does not observe the ﬁnancial advisor's portfolio choice at the beginning of time t,
she can easily obtain information about past return process and total wealth level at the end of time t = 1, . . . , T .
Competitive market assumption implies the ﬁnancial advisor is monitored by his competitors at the end of period T
and mischievous act will be publicized by them, which will damage his reputation and lower the possibility of being
hired by another investor. Therefore, the ﬁnancial advisor will choose the ﬁrst-best outcome of an investor's problem
and the investor dose not have to consider the incentive compatibility condition of the ﬁnancial advisor.
14See Ou-Yang (2003) for continuous-time dynamic optimization problem in a delegated portfolio management
problem. He argues that a ﬁnancial advisor will exactly follow an investor's optimal portfolio policy if a symmetric
(i.e., reward and punishment) remuneration scheme is oﬀered.
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Vt (Wt, Ht, pit, yt)
= max
{at,lt,pit+1,ct}
ut (ct, Lt) + βEt [Vt+1 (Wt+1, Ht+1, pit+1, yt+1)]
s.t ct ≤Wt + ltHtYt
Wt+1 =
(
1− 1{at=2}ϕt
)
Rpt+1 (Wt + ltHtYt − ct)
Rpt+1 = (1− pit+1)R+ pit+1Rt+1
Ht+1 = (1− δt)Ht + Ft (Ht, lt)
lt + Lt + φt1{at=1} = 1
yt+1 = η + ρyt + t+1
pit+1 = pit if at = 0
where I denote at = 0 as portfolio inertia, at = 1 as active management and at = 2 as hiring a
ﬁnancial advisor. And Vt ≡
{
V it , V
a
t , V
d
t
}
where V it is the value function for the portfolio inertia
case, V at is the value function for active management, and V
d
t is the value function for delegating
portfolio management.
An important speciﬁcation in this model is the job-speciﬁc human capital accumulation func-
tion Ft (Ht,, ht). I will specify this function [see Ben-Porath (1967)] as follows
Ft (Ht, lt) = a (Htlt)
θ , (θ < 1)
where a is a parameter that represents the individual eﬃciency or the learning ability for accumulat-
ing human capital15. The elasticity θ of human capital accumulation is assumed to have decreasing
returns to scale (θ ∈ (0, 1)).
4 Model solution
4.1 Existence of the Solution
Since an investor is not sure about the future chosen portfolio adjustment scheme, there is no
simple Euler equation that links the marginal beneﬁt of today's portfolio adjustment with the
15Note that I am not using exactly the same notion of human capital as Ben-Porath (1967). He interpreted human
capital as something to be accumulated only by getting more education at school. In this model, human capital
represents job-speciﬁc skill, knowledge or reputation in a current workplace which is accumulated by working, not
education at school.
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future marginal beneﬁt [Adda and Cooper (2003)]. However, the existence of a solution can be
shown by the Backward Induction and the Weierstrass Theorem.
Proposition 3. There exist optimal sets of policies {at, ct, pit+1, lt}Tt=1 for an investor's dynamic
portfolio choice problem.
Proof. See the appendix.
The existence of solutions is guaranteed, but deriving them is analytically intractable. There-
fore, this model will be solved numerically via backward induction, polynomial approximation of
the value function, Monte-Carlo integration and the Nelder-Mead simplex method.
4.2 Numerical Solution and Baseline Parameters
I will brieﬂy describe the procedure for obtaining the numerical solution to the investor's prob-
lem16. In the last period T , assuming VT+1 = 0 and aT = 0, the investor maximizes her utility
over cT and lT at every pair of state variables (WT , HT , piT , yT ). Thus, VT (WT , HT , piT , yT ) =
max{cT ,lT } u (cT , 1− lT ). This maximization problem is solved by the Nelder-Mead simplex method.
Then, I approximate VˆT by the polynomial regression of the maximized value VT over the pairs of
state variable (WT , HT , piT , yT ). In period T − 1, I calculate V iT−1, V aT−1, V dT−1 by their deﬁni-
tion with the Monte Carlo integration of ET−1
[
VˆT (WT , HT , piT , yT )
]
and the Nelder-Mead op-
timization method over (lT−1, piT , cT ). Of course, piT = piT−1 in calculating V iT−1. Then, I get
VT−1 (WT−1, HT−1, piT−1, yT−1) = max
{
V iT−1, V
a
T−1, V
d
T−1
}
and we know portfolio inertia is opti-
mal when V iT−1 = max
{
V iT−1, V
a
T−1, V
d
T−1
}
. Another choice of management scheme is similarly
derived. Then I approximate VˆT−1 by the polynomial regression of VT−1 over the pair of state
variables(WT−1, HT−1, piT−1, yT−1). Iterating these steps until the ﬁrst period, I get the approxi-
mated value functions
{
Vˆt
}T
t=1
and this characterizes the solution of the investor's problem com-
pletely. Then I generate 1,000 sample paths of individual investors with the variations of the wage
shock and the stock market return shock17.
In order to describe the model's characterization of the portfolio inertia and its prediction
of the impact of a ﬁnancial advisory service, we need to choose a reasonable set of parameters. I
set the coeﬃcient of risk aversion γ to 2.5 and the leisure preference α to 0.9 as in Gomes et al.
(2008). The discounting factor β is set to 0.95. I set the elasticity parameter θ in the experience
16This numerical procedure is implemented with FORTRAN90 with the GNU Gfortran compiler in the Wharton
Grid system and it took approximately 20 hours.
17Variation in the stock market return implies that individual investors hold diﬀerent sets of equity, so they may
face diﬀerent stock returns but the return distributions are still the same (IID log normal).
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accumulation function to 0.209 and the accumulation rate a is set to 0.7 as in Huggett et al. (2006).
Additionally, human capital Ht depreciates with rate of 1.4% per annum as in Huggett et al. (2006).
For the AR(1) process for the wage shock, the drift parameter η is set to 0.08 and the
autocorrelation coeﬃcient is set to 0.85 with a wage shock standard deviation of 0.1389. The
riskless asset return R is set to 1.02 [Cocco et al. (2005)] and the risk premium is 4% with a
standard deviation of 0.205 [Gomes et al. (2008)]. The portfolio management fee ϕt is set to 1.3%,
which is the average management fee for U.S portfolio allocation mutual funds [MorningStar 2009]
18.
The eﬃciency pattern of ﬁnancial decision making is assumed to be of convex form, as sup-
ported by evidence presented in Sumit Agarwal and Laibson (2009). The age group with 30 working
years is assumed to be the most ﬁnancially savvy, with φ22 = 0.03 (they are assumed to sacriﬁce only
3% of their normalized time). Young investors are assumed to have the lowest eﬃciency φ1 = 0.09
19.
The functional form of decision eﬃciency is assumed to be φt =
0.09−0.03
304
(age− 30)4 + 0.03, where
the 4th power represents a ﬂatter eﬃciency pattern in middle-aged. This set of baseline parameters
is summarized in Table 1.
4.3 Solution and its Implication
Figures 1 and 2 plot the average proportions of the chosen portfolio management schemes in diﬀerent
scenarios; one without a delegation option and one with a delegation option. Figure 1 shows that,
consistent with the empirical evidence, portfolio inertia is the main portfolio management scheme
implemented by most investors. Most younger workers choose portfolio inertia rather than to
actively self-manage their asset allocations. Middle-aged workers are the most active group, but
almost 40% of them still ﬁnd it optimal to not touch their portfolio allocation. This high level of
inactivity is consistent with several examples from the empirical literature [Mitchell et al. (2006);
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)]. Portfolio inertia in a young working group reﬂects their concern about
human capital accumulation, which will be a source of their labor income in future periods. Because
they have the longest horizon of human capital usage among working groups, it is optimal for them
to not sacriﬁce their time by ﬁddling around with their ﬁnancial portfolios, which is not in their
professional area. The middle-aged group has the lowest deﬁciency in ﬁnancial decision making, and
18Even though the role of a ﬁnancial advisor is somewhat diﬀerent from that of a mutual fund, it is known that
their fee levels are similar (c.f., Investopia.com).
19This choice does not depend on any empirical evidence, so it needs to be estimated by this model with any
relevant data. A time cost of 9% is quite high, but this will make it apparent how eﬃciency patterns will aﬀect the
portfolio management scheme.
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their human capital is abundant compared to their younger counterparts. Thus, sacriﬁcing a small
amount of time will not necessarily hurt their life-time value much, even when their labor income is
not very high. Inactivity in the older working group can similarly be explained by their deﬁciency in
ﬁnancial decision making. These people face low eﬃciency in their ﬁnancial decision making, which
means they have to sacriﬁce a larger fraction of their time to self-manage their portfolio. Thus, it
will be costlier for them to self-manage their portfolio than it will be for the middle-aged group.
However, they are still more active than young investors, because the decreasing returns to scale
property of human capital accumulation makes it less costly to adjust their portfolio in terms of
future labor income.
Figure 2 shows the proportions of the chosen management schemes when there is an option
to hire ﬁnancial advisor. First, we observe a decrease in portfolio inertia across all age groups.
Approximately 85% of young workers, 20% of middle-aged workers and 7% of old workers choose
portfolio inertia as their management scheme. Second, delegating portfolio management becomes
the dominant portfolio management scheme across all age groups, replacing the importance of the
active management scheme in the previous case. Approximately 15% of young workers, 60% of
middle-aged workers and 90% of old workers want to delegate their portfolio management task to
ﬁnancial advisors. Third, the active management scheme is implemented mostly by middle-aged
workers with working experience between 23 to 41 years (i.e., workers age 34 to 62, if we assume
people enter the labor market at 21 years old). Only a small fraction (less than 1%) of young
workers and 5% of old workers choose active self-management. About 15% of middle-aged workers
choose active self-management as their ﬁnancial management scheme. These observations show
that introducing a portfolio delegation option has a substantial impact on all age groups, especially
younger and older investors. The model incorporates a delegation option along with portfolio inertia
and active management, so if the new option does not provide any beneﬁt to investors, their choice
should not be diﬀerent from the previous one. But as the new solutions shows, the middle-aged and
older groups chose the delegation option as their main management scheme.
The pattern of portfolio management scheme selection reﬂects the pattern of decision-making
deﬁciency and human capital accumulation. For younger investors, their shallow pool of human
capital makes it too costly for them to spend their time managing their ﬁnancial assets, which does
not explicitly increase their human capital or job-speciﬁc knowledge. When there is no delegation
option, their best strategy was to choose `no-touch' so that they could fully make use of their
available time to work and accumulate job-speciﬁc skills. But when the delegation option is available,
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many of them ﬁnd it optimal to pay the management fee and delegate their portfolio management
rather than self-manage their money. If some of them expect their current portfolios to be near
optimal in the next period, they will still choose portfolio inertia without paying a fee to a ﬁnancial
advisor or sacriﬁcing their time (see Proposition 2). Older investors also ﬁnd it helpful to have a
ﬁnancial advisor. With more accumulated ﬁnancial wealth, their need to have someone to manage
their assets becomes very high. Because they undergo a high level of deﬁciency when making their
ﬁnancial decisions, they would choose to pay a management fee and they do not sacriﬁce their time.
They ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to fully make use of their time to work or enjoy leisure. It is noteworthy
that the middle-aged working group remains the most active ﬁnancial decision makers. They are
actively participating in their portfolio reallocation by either choosing active management or hiring
ﬁnancial advisors. Since this group is more active in self-management, they may have more demand
for a brokerage service than other age groups.
Figure 3 plots the portfolio choice in each scenario over the lifecycle. One noticeable ﬁnding
is that people without a delegation option are likely to hold a lower fraction of the risky asset in
comparison with those with a delegation option in their early career stages. Since the delegation
option saves investors' time, they can fully make use of their time to work and accumulate more
human capital, which is safer than equity. Therefore, they have more of a buﬀer to the poten-
tially negative shock of equity returns and they can invest more in risky asset. With our baseline
parameters, middle-aged people invest most of their wealth in equity.
Figure 4 plots the consumption level over the lifecycle in the two scenarios. We ﬁnd that
investors with a delegation option can consume more than those without a delegation option. There
is little diﬀerence in the two scenarios (i.e., with and without a delegation option) in the early
working periods, but the delegation service brings more consumption in the middle and later years.
When delegating ﬁnancial management is available, workers can allocate more time to their work and
accumulate more job-speciﬁc knowledge, which leads to higher income and consumption. Figure
5 plots the average wealth of investors. We observe that ﬁnancial advisory service can bring a
higher level of wealth eventually. This is not because they bring much higher excess return in
ﬁnancial management but they save time and the deﬁciency cost which is associated with portfolio
management in this model. These two ﬁgures suggest that there is a beneﬁt introduced by a
delegation option. Investors can consume more and accumulate more wealth when a delegation
option is available because they can fully make use of their time to accumulate their job-speciﬁc
skills. In this model, a small management fee (1.13%) is a worthwhile cost for investors, who are
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responsible for managing their ﬁnancial assets, but are not usually very well informed about the
task.
Figure 6 plots the fraction of investors' available time allocated to their own work. It has
an inverse U-shape over the lifecycle, which is consistent with the macroeconomics literature. If
a ﬁnancial advisory service is not available, the worker must sacriﬁce some portion of his time,
which could have been allocated to working, to self-manage his asset. In the early career stage,
the delegation option enables workers to allocate more time to working and accumulating more
human capital. In the later career stages, the option enables the worker to work less (and therefore
enjoy more leisure), but continue to accumulate human capital by sparing time spent on ﬁnancial
management. Saved time can be allocated to leisure too, which will lead to higher life-time utility.
Figure 7 plots the pattern of accumulated human capital over the lifecycle. We ﬁnd that
investors with a delegation option can accumulate more human capital than those without a del-
egation option. With the delegation option available, workers can fully make use of their time to
work without ﬁddling around with their ﬁnancial wealth and thus enjoy more leisure with the same
level of human capital accumulation compared to that of a self-management case.
The welfare gain is measured in terms of certainty equivalent (CE) constant consumption
stream, which is standard in the related literature. It is deﬁned as the stream of consumption that
would provide the same level of expected lifetime utility as the uncertain consumption and leisure
the investor expects20.
Figure 8 plots the pattern of welfare gains over age when utilizing a ﬁnancial advisory service
for diﬀerent levels of relative risk aversion. With the baseline parameters, we get a 19.5% increased
level of annual consumption stream when the delegation option is available to young investors. This
implies that investors can enjoy a 19.5% higher annual consumption stream when they have the
20In the manner of Chai et al. (2009), the certainty equivalent(CE) consumption (cCE) is deﬁned as
Vt (W1, H1, pi1, y1) =E
[
T∑
i=t−1
βi
1
1− γ (ci (Li)
α)1−γ
]
=
T∑
i=t−1
βi
1
1− γ
(
ctCE (L∗)
α)1−γ
where L∗ is a ﬁxed level of leisure and (W1, H1, pi1, y1) is the initial pair of state. With some algebraic manipulation,
we get
ctCE =
[
(1− γ)Vt∑T
i=t−1 (L
α∗ )
1−γ βi
]1−γ
In calculating this measure, I set leisure amount L∗ as time deducted by mean labor hours up to working year 40
because labor supply decreases signiﬁcantly after that time.
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option to hire ﬁnancial advisors to manage their ﬁnancial portfolios. This quantity is substantial
compared to that of Cocco et al. (2005), which measured the welfare gains of ﬂexible portfolio
allocation at around 2% compared to the ﬁxed equity share investment heuristic.
It also shows that the magnitude of welfare gain over age is U-shaped. Young and old workers
are most beneﬁted by the delegation option. Welfare gains get higher when the relative risk aversion
gets higher. When investors have high risk aversion, the time sacriﬁced to accumulate more human
capital will be even costlier, because their safe asset (labor income) decreases. Therefore, the option
to delegate the task of ﬁnancial management will be more beneﬁcial to them compared to those
with lower risk aversion.
It is noteworthy that the welfare gains introduced by a delegation option in this model are
smaller than the true enhancement. This measure does not take into account the possible additional
beneﬁts that ﬁnancial advisors can bring about, such as low transaction costs by economies of scale
and (possible) excess returns.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection, I check the robustness of the result by varying key parameters and investigate
the role that the parameters play in the model's predictions.
Figure 10 plots the choice of portfolio management scheme with diﬀerent levels of risk-aversion.
People are likely to choose portfolio inertia more as risk-aversion increases. When a delegation option
is available, it dominates the other two management schemes for most age groups. However, more
people are likely to self-manage their portfolios when risk aversion decreases. This increased level
of active management can be explained by the human capital accumulation process in this model.
When an investor is more risk-tolerant, the cost of active management is less costly because they
have more appetite for a risky asset, thus the sacriﬁced time to accumulate human capital, which
leads to higher labor income (a safer asset than equity) becomes less costly.
Figure 11 plots the welfare gain with use of a ﬁnancial advisory service for diﬀerent levels
of ﬁnancial decision making eﬃciency. This ﬁgure implies that the welfare gain is higher when
investors' ﬁnancial management eﬃciency is low. Since ﬁnancial advisors help to save investors' time
associated with ﬁnancial management ineﬃciency, people with low levels of ﬁnancial management
skill will be beneﬁted more than those with high levels of skill. This result suggests that governments
should devise a policy to make ﬁnancial advisory services accessible to investors' with low ﬁnancial
literacy, especially younger and older investors.
19
5 Conclusion
This study develops a lifecycle model to solve an optimal portfolio management scheme of ﬁnitely-
lived investors who face portfolio management costs and the age-dependent ineﬃciency of ﬁnancial
decision making. Since investors accumulate job-speciﬁc knowledge by working, portfolio adjustment
costs can have diﬀerent impacts on diﬀerent age groups. Based on a reasonable set of parameters,
the model replicates portfolio inertia over all age groups, especially for young and old investors. This
is because investors in their early career stages have a higher rate of human capital accumulation
and thus spending time in ﬁnancial management, which is not closely relevant to their job-speciﬁc
skills, is very costly. Middle-aged investors are the most active group in terms of managing their
own portfolios but almost 50% of them choose to remain inactive. A decreased eﬃciency level
of ﬁnancial decision making induced a signiﬁcant portion of old investors to also choose portfolio
inertia.
The model enables us to perform counterfactual experiments about the choice of portfolio
management scheme when the option of delegating portfolio management to ﬁnancial advisors is
available. Under the baseline parameters, the delegation option replaces portfolio inertia across all
age groups. About 30% of young investors switch from portfolio inertia to portfolio management
delegation. Approximately 70% of middle-aged investors hire ﬁnancial advisors, but they still remain
as the most active self management group. Approximately 80% of old investors delegate their
portfolio management to ﬁnancial advisors and less than 5% of them still manage their portfolios
themselves. In general, the model predicts that old investors will be the biggest customer group of
ﬁnancial advisors.
The welfare gains resulting from the introduction of a delegation option are substantial as
measured by the constant consumption stream of certainty equivalent (CE). With baseline pa-
rameters, the introduction of a delegation option will increase young investors' constant stream of
certainty equivalent (CE) consumption by 19.5%. This means investors can enjoy a higher level of
annual consumption across the lifecycle when the delegation option is available. The level of the
welfare gain is substantially higher than that of Cocco et al. (2005) who measured the welfare gains
of ﬂexible portfolio management compared to ﬁxed asset allocation. The model also shows that
the magnitude of welfare gains over age is U-shaped. Young and old workers are most beneﬁted by
the delegation option. Since this model only considers the welfare gains of investors, it ignores the
welfare gains for the ﬁnancial advisory industry. Thus, the actual welfare gains to the economy will
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be greater than the calculated level.
These ﬁndings have relevant implications for retirement plan sponsors, the ﬁnancial advisory
industry and policy makers wishing to support diverse age groups in retirement plans. As this
paper's model predicts, ﬁnancial advisory services will be very appealing to younger and older
investors, and the availability of such services will have a meaningful impact on these groups'
portfolio management. In addition, the ﬁnancial advisors to middle-aged investors should also
consider the fact that some of them still want to remain active in managing their ﬁnancial assets,
even when a delegation option is available. These people may have demand for brokerage services
to self-manage their ﬁnancial wealth.
Policy makers should consider the potential positive welfare gains of improving investors'
access to prudential ﬁnancial advisory services. Devising a policy to secure the ﬁduciary role of
ﬁnancial advisors will assist investors in managing their ﬁnancial wealth optimally.
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Table 1: Parameter Values for Numerical Solution
Parameter Baseline Source
Working periods T 45 -
Time discounting β 0.95 -
Risk aversion γ 2.5 -
Leisure preference α 0.9 Gomes et al. (2008)
Experience formulation a 0.209 Huggett et al. (2006)
Elasticity of Ht accumulation θ 0.7 Huggett et al. (2006)
Lowest ineﬃciency of ﬁnancial decision φlow 0.03 -
Highest ineﬃciency of ﬁnancial decision φhigh 0.09 -
Depreciation of Human Capital δt 1.4% per annum Huggett et al. (2006)
Eﬃciency of ﬁnancial decision making φt
0.09−0.03
304
(age− 30)4 + 0.03 -
Wage shock drift η 0.08 -
Wage shock auto correlation ρ 0.85 -
Std. of Wage shock σwage 0.1389 Gomes et al. (2008)
Risk premium 0.04 Gomes et al. (2008)
Std. of stock return σstock 0.205 Gomes et al. (2008)
Risk free rate R 1.02 Cocco et al. (2005)
Delegation annual fee ϕt 1.3% per annum MorningStar(2009)
Correlation between wage and stock return σζ 0 Cocco et al. (2005)
Initial wealth for simulation W0 0 -
Initial human capital for simulation H0 10 90.48% of ﬁrst year wage
Initial equity share for simulation pi0 0 Ameriks and Zeldes (2000)
Initial wage shock for simulation y0 0.1 -
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Figure 1: Portfolio Management Scheme Without Delegation Option
This ﬁgure shows the choice of portfolio management scheme when ﬁnancial advisory service is
NOT available. This ﬁgure replicates the empirical ﬁnding in the household ﬁnance literature that
severe inactivity in individual portfolio management is widespread. When an investor does not
have a delegation option, young investors are likely to choose `no touch' strategy for their portfolio
management. Since young workers have low levels of accumulated human capital but have long
horizon to use it, their foregone opportunity to accumulate human capital might be costlier than
the other ages groups with a high level of human capital accumulation. A fraction of old investors are
likely to choose to be inactive because they have to incur ineﬃciency cost for making a sophisticated
ﬁnancial decision. Middle-aged people is more active in portfolio management compared to their
younger and older counterparts.
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Figure 2: Portfolio Management Scheme With Delegation Option
This ﬁgure shows the proportions of the chosen management schemes when there is an option
to hire ﬁnancial advisor. First, we observe a decrease in portfolio inertia across all age groups.
Approximately 85% of young workers, 20% of middle-aged workers and 7% of old workers choose
portfolio inertia as their management scheme. Second, delegating portfolio management becomes
the dominant portfolio management scheme across all age groups, replacing the importance of the
active management scheme in the previous case. Approximately 15% of young workers, 60% of
middle-aged workers and 90% of old workers want to delegate their portfolio management task to
ﬁnancial advisors. Third, the active management scheme is implemented mostly by middle-aged
workers with working experience between 23 to 41 years (i.e., workers age 34 to 62, if we assume
people enter the labor market at 21 years old). Only a small fraction (less than 1%) of young
workers and 5% of old workers choose active self-management. About 15% of middle-aged workers
choose active self-management as their ﬁnancial management scheme. These observations show
that introducing a portfolio delegation option has a substantial impact on all age groups, especially
younger and older investors.
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Figure 3: Portfolio Choice over the Lifecycle
This ﬁgure plots the portfolio choice in each scenario over the lifecycle. One noticeable ﬁnding is that
people without a delegation option are likely to hold a lower fraction of the risky asset in comparison
with those with a delegation option in their early career stages. Since the delegation option saves
investors' time, they can fully make use of their time to work and accumulate more human capital,
which is safer than equity. Therefore, they have more of a buﬀer to the potentially negative shock of
equity returns and they can invest more in risky asset. With our baseline parameters, middle-aged
people invest most of their wealth in equity.
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Figure 4: Consumption Level over the Lifecycle
This ﬁgure plots the consumption level over the lifecycle in the two scenarios. We ﬁnd that investors
with a delegation option can consume more than those without a delegation option. There is little
diﬀerence in the two scenarios (i.e., with and without a delegation option) in the early working
periods, but the delegation service brings more consumption in the middle and later years. When
delegating ﬁnancial management is available, workers can allocate more time to their work and
accumulate more job-speciﬁc knowledge, which leads to higher income and consumption.
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Figure 5: Wealth Level over the Lifecycle
This ﬁgure plots the average wealth level of investors over the lifecycle. We observe that ﬁnancial
advisory service can bring a higher level of wealth eventually. This is not because they bring much
higher excess return in ﬁnancial management but they save time and the deﬁciency cost which is
associated with portfolio management in this model. This is another evidence for the claim that
introducing delegation or advisory service will produce signiﬁcant welfare gain for investors.
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Figure 6: Working Time Chosen over the Lifecycle
This ﬁgure plots the fraction of investors' available time allocated to their own work. It has an inverse
U-shape over the lifecycle, which is consistent with the macroeconomics literature. If a ﬁnancial
advisory service is not available, the worker must sacriﬁce some portion of his time, which could
have been allocated to working, to self-manage his asset. In the early career stage, the delegation
option enables workers to allocate more time to working and accumulating more human capital. In
the later career stages, the option enables the worker to work less (and therefore enjoy more leisure),
but continue to accumulate human capital by sparing time spent on ﬁnancial management. Saved
time can be allocated to leisure too, which will lead to higher life-time utility.
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Figure 7: Human Capital Accumulation Pattern over the Lifecycle
This ﬁgure plots the pattern of accumulated human capital over the lifecycle. We ﬁnd that investors
with a delegation option can accumulate more human capital than those without a delegation
option. With the delegation option available, workers can fully make use of their time to work
without ﬁddling around with their ﬁnancial wealth and thus enjoy more leisure with the same level
of human capital accumulation compared to that of a self-management case.
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Figure 8: Welfare gains for Diﬀerent Risk Aversion Parameters (ρ)
This ﬁgure plots the pattern of welfare gains over ages by a ﬁnancial advisory service for diﬀerent
levels of relative risk aversion. It shows that the magnitude of welfare gains over ages are U-
shaped. Young and old workers are most beneﬁted by the delegation option. Welfare gains get
higher when the relative risk aversion gets higher. When investors have high risk aversion, the time
sacriﬁced to accumulate more human capital will be even costlier, because their safe asset (labor
income) decreases. Therefore, the option to delegate the task of ﬁnancial management will be more
beneﬁcial to them compared to those with lower risk aversion.
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Figure 9: Welfare gains for Diﬀerent Ineﬃciency Parameters (φHigh)
This ﬁgure plots the welfare gain with use of a ﬁnancial advisory service for diﬀerent levels of ﬁnancial
decision making eﬃciency. This ﬁgure implies that the welfare gain is higher when investors' ﬁnancial
management eﬃciency is low. Since ﬁnancial advisors help to save investors' time associated with
ﬁnancial management ineﬃciency, people with low levels of ﬁnancial management skill will be
beneﬁted more than those with high levels of skill. This result suggests that governments should
devise a policy to make ﬁnancial advisory services accessible to investors' with low ﬁnancial literacy,
especially younger and older investors.
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Figure 10: Patterns of Management Scheme with Diﬀerent Risk Aversions (ρ)
This ﬁgure plots the choice of portfolio management scheme with diﬀerent levels of risk-aversion.
People are likely to choose portfolio inertia more as risk-aversion increases. When a delegation
option is available, it dominates the other two management schemes for most age groups. However,
more people are likely to self-manage their portfolios when risk aversion decreases. This increased
level of active management can be explained by the human capital accumulation process in this
model. When an investor is more risk-tolerant, the cost of active management is less costly because
they have more appetite for a risky asset, thus the sacriﬁced time to accumulate human capital,
which leads to higher labor income (a safer asset than equity) becomes less costly.
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Figure 11: Patterns of Management Scheme with Diﬀerent Eﬃciency Parameters (φHigh)
This ﬁgure shows that the choice patterns of portfolio management schemes are similar for diﬀerent
ineﬃciency parameters φHigh on ﬁnancial decision making. One interesting ﬁnding is that the
result is robust to the assumption on a shape of ineﬃciency pattern over ages. The baseline case
assumes a U-shaped ineﬃciency pattern of ﬁnancial decision making but the model with a ﬂat
ineﬃciency pattern over ages also generate similar results to that of the baseline case. The portion
of portfolio inertia is lowest among middle-aged workers and highest among young workers. The
delegation option dominates the other two alternatives and small portion of middle-aged workers
are likely to self-manage their portfolio. This robustness result shows that the choice pattern of
ﬁnancial management schemes over ages is not driven by the shape of ineﬃciency pattern of ﬁnancial
decision making.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Deﬁne the excess value of choosing inertia portfolio over active management scheme as
V˜t (lt, pit+1, ct; Wt, Ht, pit, yt) ≡V it (Wt, Ht, pit, yt)
− {u (ct, 1− lt − φt) + βEt [Vt+1 (Wt+1, Ht+1, pit+1, yt+1)]}
The latter part is the objective function of active portfolio management scheme. Then,the excess
value function is
V˜t
(
lˆit, pˆi
i
t+1, cˆ
i
t; Wt, Ht, pit, yt
)
=u
(
cˆit, 1− lˆit
)
− u
(
cˆit, 1− φt − lˆit
)
>0
because utility function u is increasing in leisure time. Since V˜t (·; Wt, Ht, pit, yt) is continuous
in (lt, pit+1, ct), then ∃δ > 0 such that ∀ (lt, pit+1, ct) with d
[
(lt, pit+1, ct) ,
(
lˆit, pit, cˆ
i
t
)]
< δ, we have
V˜t (lt, pit+1, ct; Wt, Ht, pit, yt) > 0. Choose δ
∗ =
√
δ
3 . By the assumption thatmax
{∣∣∣lˆat − lˆit∣∣∣ , ∣∣cˆat − cˆit∣∣} <∣∣pˆiat+1 − pit∣∣, the condition ∣∣pˆiat+1 − pit∣∣ < δ∗ implies that
∣∣∣lˆat − lˆit∣∣∣2 + ∣∣pˆiat+1 − pit∣∣2 + ∣∣cˆat − cˆit∣∣2 < 3 (δ∗)2 = δ
Thus, V it (Wt, Ht, pit, yt) −
{
u
(
cˆat , 1− lˆat − φt
)
+ βEt
[
Vt+1
(
Wt+1, Ht+1, pˆi
a
t+1, yt+1
)]}
> 0 and the
latter part is now V at (Wt, Ht, pit, yt) because
(
lˆat , pˆi
a
t+1, cˆ
a
t
)
is the solution of active management
scheme. So we showed V it > V
a
t for all pˆi
a
t+1 with
∣∣pˆiat+1 − pit∣∣ < δ∗. QED
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
I use backward induction to show the existence of a solution for an investor's portfolio choice problem
without delegation option. The existence of solution for delegation option can be similarly proved.
Using a discrete choice model, I can deﬁne a value function as
Vt (Wt,Ht, pit, yt) = max
{
V at (Wt,Ht, pit, yt) , V
i
t (Wt,Ht, pit, yt)
}
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for all state vector {(Wt,Ht, pit, yt)}Tt=1. The superscript a denotes the portfolio adjustment and i
denotes inaction. The value functions for each decisions are deﬁned as
V at (Wt, Ht, pit, yt) = max{ct,pit+1,lt}
ut (ct, Lt) + βEt [Vt+1 (Wt+1, Ht+1, pit+1, yt+1)]
s.t ct ≤Wt + ltHtYt
Wt+1 = R
p
t+1 (Wt + ltHtYt − ct)
Ht+1 = (1− δt)Ht + Ft (Ht, lt)
lt + Lt + φt = 1
yt+1 = η + ρyt + t+1
and for the inactivity case
V it (Wt, Ht, pit, yt) = max{ct,lt}
ut (ct, Lt) + βEt [Vt+1 (Wt+1, Ht+1, pit+1 = pit, yt+1)]
s.t ct ≤Wt + ltHtYt
Wt+1 = R
p
t+1 (Wt + ltHtYt − ct)
Ht+1 = (1− δt)Ht + Ft (Ht, lt)
lt + Lt = 1
yt = η + ρyt−1 + t
Now, I can use a backward induction.
1. At the retirement period T, an investor does not make any portfolio decision(piT+1 = piT ) and
consumes all his wealth
cT = R
p
T (WT + l
∗
tHTYT )
where l∗t is determined by static optimal decision between lt and Lt with lt+Lt = 1 (φt = 0).
Now, VT (WT,HT , piT , yT ) for each state is well deﬁned and we can ﬁnd V
a
T−1 (·) and V iT−1 (·)
by their deﬁnitions.
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2. With known V aT−1 (·) and V iT−1 (·), I can ﬁnd VT−1 (·) as
VT−1 (·) = max
{
V aT−1 (·) , V iT−1 (·)
}
And we know there exist a solution for V aT−1 and V
i
T−1 because the constraint sets are compact
and objective function is continuous [The Weierstrass Theorem].
3. Repeat step 1 and 2 until the ﬁrst period.
4. After I ﬁnd value functions at every periods, I can derive policy functions, especially portfolio
adjustment decision at each period.
When delegation is available, an investor can fully utilize her time to work optimally. The value
function at each state vector is deﬁned as
Vt (Wt,Ht, pit, yt) = max
{
V at (Wt,Ht, pit, yt) , V
i
t (Wt,Ht, pit, yt) , V
d
t (Wt,Ht, pit, yt)
}
for all state vector (Wt,Ht, pit, yt). The superscript d denotes delegating to a professional money
manager. The value functions V at (Wt,Ht, pit, yt) , V
i
t (Wt,Ht, pit, yt) are deﬁned in the same way in
the previous section. With management fee(ϕt), the value function with delegation option is deﬁned
as
V dt (Wt, Ht, pit, yt) = max
ct,pit+1,lt
ut (ct, Lt) + βEt [Vt+1 (Wt+1, yt+1, pit+1, yt+1)]
s.t ct ≤Wt + ltHtYt
Wt+1 = (1− ϕt)Rpt+1 (Wt + ltHtYt − ct)
Ht+1 = (1− δt)Ht + Ft (Ht, lt)
lt + Lt = 1
yt = η + ρyt−1 + t
Since VT is well deﬁned as shown above, {Vt}T−1t=1 is well deﬁned and we know the maximization
problems have solutions.
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